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Recent research regarding property rights and economic development often treats 
property rights security in a country as homogeneous, although protecting the private 
entitlements of some can entail preventing others from claiming and controlling those 
same resources. This one-dimensional conception of property rights ignores the 
significant variation in the risk of expropriation faced by different groups in the same 
country. Using a new set of indicators that measures the property insecurity of 
ethnocultural minorities, this study finds that in many countries members of 
marginalized groups face significantly higher property insecurity than foreign investors 
and domestic elites, and that although secure property rights for elites and foreign 
investors may be positively related to long-run development, property rights for 
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1   Introduction 
Before property rights can be strong or weak, they must be allocated and defined 
(Kennedy 2009), and the allocation and enforcement of resource entitlements through 
legal institutions often reflects the distribution of political power (Libecap 1989; 
Ensminger 1992; La Croix and Roumasset 1990; Sened 1997; Alston 1996; Firmin-
Sellers 1996; Wyman 2005; Alston et al. 2009). Yet much recent cross-country research 
regarding property rights and economic development employs a ‘blackbox’ conception 
of property rights that effaces potential heterogeneity in property rights enjoyment 
within countries (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Rodrik et al. 2004; Bockstette et al. 
2002; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Kaufmann et al. 1999; Hall and Jones 1999; Clague 
et al. 1999; Knack and Keefer 1995). A one-dimensional conception of property rights 
ignores significant variation in the risk of expropriation faced by different ethnic, 
cultural, and religious groups in the same country.  
 
Using a new set of indicators that measures the property insecurity of ethnocultural 
minorities, this study finds that severe property insecurity for some groups often exists 
alongside secure property rights for other groups. In many countries, members of 
marginalized groups face significantly higher property insecurity than foreign investors 
and domestic elites. The cross-national indices of institutional quality widely used in the 
research literature—initially designed to assess the property security of foreign 
investors—fail to adequately account for the institutional framework encountered by 
marginalized minority groups.  
 
A vast and significant body of scholarship has long held secure property rights to be a 
fundamental prerequisite for trade, efficient investments, credit access, liberty, 
government accountability, growth-promoting economic policies, and a myriad other 
engines of economic development (Rousseau 1754; Smith 1776; Marx 1867; Coase 
1960; Demsetz 1967; Hayek 1976; Williamson 1985; North and Weingast 1989; North 
1990; Besley 1995; Alston et al. 1996; Posner 1998; De Soto 2000; Acemoglu et al. 
2001; Field 2005; Udry and Goldstein 2008; Besley and Ghatak 2009). Yet, historically, 
economic development has often involved the expropriation of land and resources from 
marginalized minorities and the reallocation of these resources into the hands of those 
with access to the knowledge and capital necessary for efficient investment (World 
Commission on Dams 2000; Yelling 1977; Pierson 1938; Public Broadcasting Service 
n.d.). Reconciling this apparent contradiction requires recognizing that whose property 
rights are secure  matters fundamentally for the economic implications of secure 
property rights.  
 
This study shows that property rights for marginalized groups are not related to long-run 
development. Economic growth can occur when the property rights of elites are secure 
but marginalized minorities face high a risk of expropriation, because land may be 
reallocated into the hands of investors with better access to know-how, capital, and 
other complementary production inputs. At the same time, secure property rights for 
marginalized minorities are not required for the government accountability that 
facilitates aggregate growth-enhancing economic policies: security of property rights for 
elites can increase accountability of the governing elites towards other elites with 
divergent interests, while broad but not universal property rights security can generate 2 
 
accountability of public officials to the majority but still exclude the minority. Both 
mechanisms incentivize the adoption of broadly growth-enhancing economic policies 
that benefit the majority but harm some groups.  
2   Theoretical background 
2.1  Law, power, and heterogeneity in rights enjoyment 
It is an obvious statement that law is not impartial, but in fact reflects the distribution 
and operation of political power. Yet the vast majority of recent economics research on 
the relationship between property rights and economic development does not address 
heterogeneity in the application of institutional and legal frameworks within countries. 
In the cross-country literature in particular, which aims to explain aggregate growth or 
other development outcomes with reference to institutional conditions for an entire 
country-unit, states are evaluated in terms of aggregate levels of property rights security 
and property rights protections (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Rodrik et al. 2004; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Bockstette et al. 2002; Kaufmann et al. 1999; Hall and 
Jones 1999; Clague et al. 1999; Knack and Keefer 1995). Disparities in property rights 
enjoyment between different groups within the same country are largely ignored. 
 
Work within institutional economics certainly recognizes that the ‘rules of the game’ 
depend on relations of power (e.g. Bates 1981; North and Weingast 1989; North 1990, 
2005; Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2002; Kaufmann et al. 2002; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006, 2008). The dialogic between institutional rules and organizational 
actors—in which individuals and organizations operate to maximize their own interests 
within a given set of incentives determined by the existing institutional constraints, but 
then also work to change these rules to their own benefit—is the theoretical heart of the 
vast body of research that foregrounds the role played by institutions in long-run 
development.  
 
Yet insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that not only the form of institutions, 
but also the scope and application of the rules, depends on politics and the distribution 
of power. Such a one-dimensional lens is particularly apt to distort reality in the case of 
the right to property. Given the relational nature of private property rights, alongside the 
role of political power in determining de facto institutional environments, the allocation 
and enforcement of resource entitlements is particularly prone to heterogeneous 
treatment of groups and claimants. 
 
A property right is relational—it gives the possessor superior claims to a specific 
resource against the rest of the world, or some subset thereof (Hohfeld 1917: 718-33; 
Calabresi and Melamed 1972: 1089-92). The possessor of a property right asserts and 
exercises her rights in relation to other potential claimants; she can simultaneously have 
superior rights against some, but inferior rights against others. For example, take a 
home-owner who takes out first one, then another, and then a third mortgage, using his 
home as collateral. If he defaults on all three loans, the holder of the first priority 
mortgage lien has the right to the value of the property up until the amount of the lien is 
satisfied, then the holder of the second priority lien—who has an inferior right 
compared to that of the first lender, but a superior claim to that of the third lender—has 
a right to the value of the property used as collateral until the debt is cleared, and so on 3 
 
(American Law Institute 1997). The common law rule of ‘finders keepers’ likewise 
exemplifies the relational nature of property rights—the ‘finder’ has superior rights to a 
found object against everyone except the original owner who lost the item (Armorie v. 
Delamirie 1722, Sprankling 2007). Clearly, therefore, the allocation and protection of a 
secure resource entitlement for one party inherently requires denying an alternative 
claimant the ability to control the use of that resource. 
 
The classical political economists recognized the relational nature of property rights and 
the role played by political power in defining, allocating, and enforcing claims to 
resource entitlements. Although Rousseau (1754) recognized secure private property 
rights as a prerequisite for market exchange and a functioning modern economy (Peled 
1980), he also argued that the enshrinement of property rights in a social contract was, 
in essence, a grand theft perpetrated by the rich, clever, and strong on the less well-off. 
Having obtained de facto control over land and resources, Rousseau contended that the 
de jure legal protection of these property rights claims protected and perpetuated the 
tenuous and previously contested position of elites. Marx (1844, 1867) also argued that 
the private property relations that form the legal superstructure of capitalism entrench 
the already powerful. In this view, private property leads to ever increasing inequality 
by enabling capital to be accumulated, and puts the owners of the means of production 
in an advantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis wage labourers, which allows the owners 
of capital to capture all surplus value.  
 
The role of political power in determining the scope, allocation, and enforcement of 
property rights is readily apparent both historically and in the modern administrative 
state (Libecap 1989; Ensminger 1992; La Croix and Roumasset 1990; Sened 1997; 
Alston 1996; Firmin-Sellers 1996; Wyman 2005; Alston et al. 2009). 
 
The multiplicity of potential property rights that may or may not be recognized and 
protected by de jure and de facto legal institutions also contributes to heterogeneity in 
the enjoyment of secure property rights. Property rights are widely understood by legal 
scholars as a “bundle of sticks”, with each stick in the bundle representing a right or a 
privilege (Korngold and Morriss 2009; Kennedy 2009). For example, the famous 
English case of Sturges v. Bridgman, on which Coase’s well-known article ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) was based, addressed whether a physician had the right 
to stop his next door neighbour, a confectioner, from operating his mortars to grind 
sugar. In the bundle of sticks that constituted property ownership, did the doctor have 
the right to enjoy silence so that he could see his patients undisturbed, or did the 
confectioner have the right to produce sugar in his factory? Coase argued that 
inefficiency results when neither right is clearly defined, thereby preventing bargaining; 
here the first order problem is clearly not in making the property right secure, but in 
defining and allocating it in the first place. The wide diversity of rights that may be 
enjoyed as part of a bundle of property rights is even more evident in low and middle 
income countries.  
 
Throughout Africa, for example, one user might have the right to sow and harvest, 
another to collect fruit from trees on the land, and a third to bring in livestock to feed on 
crop residues after the harvest (Bruce 1996; Benjaminsen 2002; Pande and Udry 2006). 
In southeast Nigeria and southern Mali the village leader allocates farming land to 
family heads based on need but retains reversionary rights to the land as a trustee on 
behalf of the group, while individuals have enduring rights to physical structures they 4 
 
build and any trees they plant. This means that one family could have temporary use 
rights to the soil while the son of the person who planted nut trees on the land the 
generation prior has the right to gather the nuts (Bruce 1996; Benjaminsen 2002; 
Boudreaux 2005). In the north-central flood plains of the Niger Delta, where herding, 
farming, and fishing coexist and are practiced by different ethnic groups, herders have 
the right to use given land for pasture during the off-season, while farmers use this same 
land to grow crops during a different part of the year (Bruce 1996; Dewees 1995). When 
some kinds of rights—some of the ‘sticks in the bundle’—are protected by property 
rights institutions, but others are not, the groups whose members enjoy the protected 
kinds of rights benefit, while those with unprotected rights lose out.  
 
Therefore the scope of application of property rights protection can engender 
heterogeneity in the security of property rights enjoyment. If private freehold titles are 
protected, but various usufruct rights such as hunting, fishing, grazing cattle and 
gathering berries are not, then the parties best positioned to claim private freehold 
ownership benefit while others lose access to formerly shared resources. Because 
property rights can be understood as a bundle of sticks, when different groups lay claim 
to different kinds of sticks, the recognition and protection of some rights in the bundle 
but not others creates heterogeneity in property rights security.  
 
Due to the relational, zero-sum nature of property rights, as well as the complexity and 
multidimensionality of the bundle of rights that constitute property interests, we should 
expect that the role played by political power in determining the institutional rules of the 
game will often lead to heterogeneity between groups within a country in the enjoyment 
of property rights security. 
2.2  Property rights and economic development 
There is an extraordinarily large and diverse body of research regarding the relationship 
between property rights and economic development. Most social scientists—from 
classical political economists to contemporary legal scholars and new institutional 
economists—argue that secure property rights are a necessary prerequisite for economic 
development (Rousseau 1754; Smith 1776; Marx 1867; Hayek 1976; Williamson 1985; 
North and Weingast 1989; North 1990; Alston et al. 1996; Posner 1998; Acemoglu et al. 
2001; Rodrik et al. 2004; Besley and Ghatak 2009). However, implicit and unstated in 
most of these theories is that it matters, fundamentally, whose property rights are secure. 
At a micro level, only secure property rights for those with skills, knowledge, and 
capital leads to economic growth. And at a macro level, only secure property rights for 
those who will use their political voice to agitate for growth enhancing economic 
policies is related to long-run development. 
 
At a micro level, secure property rights are thought to generate economic growth for 
three reasons. First, secure property rights internalize externalities, thereby incentivizing 
efficient levels of investment and ensuring that a resource is neither over nor under-
utilized (Demsetz 1967; Besley 1995; Field 2005; Udry and Goldstein 2008). Second, 
clear allocation and enforcement of resource entitlements can generate efficiency gains 
by reducing transaction costs in exchanges between parties and allowing reallocation to 
more efficient users (Coase 1960; Besley and Ghatak 2009). Third, secure private 
property rights may facilitate access to credit and the conversion of dead assets into 
investment capital because the underlying asset can serve as collateral, making 5 
 
repayment commitments more enforceable (De Soto 2000; Field and Torero 2006). 
Markets, credit access and efficient resource use drive economic growth by enabling 
specialization and gains from trade, providing capital for reinvestment and increasing 
productivity. 
 
At the core of these micro-theories of property rights and economic development is an 
assumption that what actually matters is property rights security for those with access to 
skills, knowledge, and capital. Appropriate know-how and access to capital is obviously 
implicit in the internalization of costs and benefits rationale for secure private property 
rights, since efficient levels of investment and resource utilization can only occur when 
the owner has complementary production inputs (Besley and Ghatak 2009: sec. 2.3). 
Moreover, a growth-enhancing reallocation of resource entitlements into the hands of 
more efficient users will not occur—even and especially with secure private property 
rights—when the existence of multiple owners creates a hold-up problem (Heller 1998), 
or when owners place an idiosyncratic, non-economic value on the property (Radin 
1982). And when property rights are secure but non-alienable, as is the case with 
forests, pastures and fisheries held collectively according to indigenous customary 
tenure law (Bruce 1998), greater property rights security for customary resource holders 
will actually prevent reallocation through voluntary market exchange. Therefore secure 
property rights for owners who lack the skills or capital to invest efficiently in a 
resource but who also will not or cannot bargain for some reason (Heller 1998; Radin 
1982; Bruce 1998) may actually prevent a more economically efficient allocation of 
resources and impede growth. The credit access theory explicitly recognizes the 
relationship between property rights, access to capital, and growth, but if the poor are 
credit constrained for exogenous reasons such as ethnic discrimination (Duca and 
Rosenthal 1993), or actually face savings rather than credit constraints (Dupas and 
Robinson 2009; Morduch 1999), then making property rights more secure will not 
‘unlock’ hidden capital.  
 
At a macro level, a number of Western political theorists have argued that secure private 
property rights engender political accountability, which in turn leads economic policies 
that are broadly growth-enhancing rather than narrowly beneficial to only powerful, 
rent-seeking elites. According to this view, private property is an essential pillar in the 
protection of individual liberty; the individual economic security private property 
provides is thought to act as a safeguard against the potentially totalitarian power of the 
State, and individuals are much more likely to actively oppose government policies 
when they know their livelihoods are not at risk (Hayek 1976). The resulting political 
accountability to a broad cross-section of the population encourages governments to 
implement economic policies that benefit society as a whole, such as investments in 
education, roads and other public goods (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2002, 2005).  
 
Related to this, some theorists argue that the failure of political interest groups to 
implement the most effective growth promoting policies, and then use political power to 
bargain over distribution, results from a commitment problem which stems from weak 
property rights (Acemoglu 2003; Acemoglu et al. 2004). Since political power is, in 
part, a result of economic power, political groups who benefit relatively less from 
growth enhancing economic policies, and foresee that their relative economic position 
will decline and thus their relative political strength as well, will resist pie-maximizing 
economic policies that hurt their relative economic positions—in fear that newly 
ascendant political-economic elites will change the rules of the game mid-stream. 6 
 
Strong protections against government expropriation theoretically allow the 
commitment problem to be overcome by ensuring that those who gain in relative 
economic strength will not use their new political power to seize the assets of those who 
gain less from pie-maximizing growth policies. 
 
Others starkly disagree, contending that private property reinforces rather than 
constrains the power of elites, because it is precisely the institution of private property 
that puts the owners of capital inputs in an advantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis 
labour. In this view, private property relations facilitate the increasing concentration of 
economic capital and corresponding political power, rather than serving as a check on 
government authority (Chibber 2003; Hay 1975: 17-63; Mandel 1992; Marx 1867).  
 
A far more nuanced understanding of the role played by secure property rights in 
generating government accountability and constraining the power of elites is clearly 
required. Elites are not a single monolithic group—different groups of elites have 
different interests, and compete amongst themselves for power (Dezalay and Garth 
2002). Security of property rights for elites can therefore increase accountability of the 
governing elites towards other elites with divergent interests (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962), incentivizing the adoption of broadly beneficial economic policies. Likewise, 
accountability of public officials to the majority, facilitated by broad but not universal 
property rights security, may incentivize growth-enhancing economic policies that 
benefit the majority even while hurting some groups. Seen in this light, secure property 
rights for marginalized minorities is not required for the kind of government 
accountability that leads to aggregate, growth-enhancing economic policies. Once again, 
security of property rights for whom matters. 
3   Property rights indicators 
3.1  Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide and the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a component of Political Risk Services 
(PRS), was first created in 1980 by the editors of a weekly newsletter on international 
finance and economics called ‘International Reports’. The purpose of the ICRG was to 
‘meet the needs of clients for an in-depth and exhaustively researched analysis of the 
potential risks to international business operations’ (PRS n.d.). According to PRS, the 
primary users and consumers of the ICRG ratings data are institutional investors, banks, 
multinational corporations, importers, exporters, and foreign exchange traders, who use 
the ICRG model to ‘determine how financial, economic, and political risk might affect 
their business and investments now and in the future’ (PRS n.d.). 
 
The risk ratings system has 22 components grouped into three major categories of risk: 
political, financial, and economic. Each component is assigned a numerical value, with 
the highest number of points indicating the lowest risk. ICRG scores are based on a 
subjective assessment by experts employed by PRS. The property rights index evaluates 
the risk of ‘outright confiscation and forced nationalization’ of property. Lower ratings 
are assigned to countries ‘where expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely 
event’ (IRIS n.d.). 
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Given that the intended customers of the ICRG are investors, multinational 
corporations, importers, and exporters, it is only logical that the ranking system would 
be targeted to reflect the investment risks posed to these kinds of customers. In other 
words, the information on expropriation risk, by its very design, is meant to reflect the 
risk posed to the enterprises of the large and often multinational businesses that are 
purchasing the ICRG data, not the average citizen of a country—and even less the 
property rights of marginalized ethno-cultural minority groups, who are clearly not 
purchasing the ICRG data. This intentional evaluation of risk from the standpoint of 
foreign investors and domestic elites is reinforced by the source of the data—expert 
evaluations—which are likely to be more familiar with threats to international capital 
than to poor local resource users (Davis 2004). 
 
A number of other indices also attempt to quantitatively measure property rights across 
countries. Most prominently, the Heritage Foundation scores ‘the degree to which a 
country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government 
enforces those laws’ (Heritage Foundation 2009). The Heritage Foundation’s property 
rights indicator is expansive, addressing: the likelihood that private property will be 
expropriated, the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the 
judiciary and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts (Heritage 
Foundation 2009). Like the ICRG index, the less certain the legal protection of property, 
the lower a country’s score. For example, a country receives 100 per cent if ‘private 
property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts 
efficiently and quickly. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate 
private property’. At the other extreme, a country receives a score of zero per cent when 
‘private property is outlawed and all property belongs to the state’. The index is a 
subjective score, based on information gleaned from the following sources, in order of 
priority: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce; U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Country Commercial Guide; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices; and U.S. Department of State, Investment Climate Statements. 
Once again, all these sources except for the U.S. State Department Reports have, as 
their primary audience, large commercial investors interested in assessing the 
investment risks posed to their business ventures. Moreover, countries receive high 
scores only for securely protecting private property rights; secure protection of the 
communal property rights of ethnocultural minorities is not considered by the index. 
This is a significant shortcoming, given that throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, 
North America and Europe over 300 million members of an estimated 6,000 indigenous 
groups hold land communally in accordance with customary law (Stavenhagen 2004; 
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2009). 
3.2  Property rights indices in the cross-country literature 
The property rights index from PRS’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) has 
been widely used in the cross-country literature as a proxy for ‘institutional quality’ 
broadly, and for the security of property rights more specifically. For example, in their 
well-known article examining the relationship between institutions and long-run growth, 
Knack and Keefer (1995) used a rescaled version of the ICRG index score to measure 
‘institutional quality’. The frequently cited work of Acemoglu et al., in which settler 
mortality is used as an instrumental variable for institutions, also relies upon the ICRG 
risk of expropriation index as a proxy for institutional quality (2001, 2002). The ICRG 
index is also pervasive in the cross-country research on the relationship between natural 8 
 
resource abundance, institutions, growth and conflict (Boschini et al. 2007; Djankov and 
Reynal-Querol 2007; Mehlum et al. 2006). 
 
The World Bank’s widely used Worldwide Governance Indicators [WGI], initially 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), incorporate the Heritage Foundation’s property 
security measure as well as the property rights measure from ICRG. The WGI consists 
of aggregate indices corresponding to six basic governance concepts: (1) voice and 
accountability; (2) political instability and violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) 
regulatory burden; (5) rule of law; and (6) graft. These aggregate indices are based on 
approximately 200 governance indicators, taken from 35 data sources—including both 
the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation Index (Kaufmann et al. 2009). It would be 
difficult to overstate the reach and influence of the WGI as a research tool in cross-
country analysis. The most recent ‘Governance Matters’ publication (Kaufmann et al. 
2009) ranks as one of the top 50 downloads on SSRN; and according to a search of the 
World Bank’s ‘Governance Matters’ website and SSRN, the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators have been used in over 150 research papers as aggregate measures of 
governance and institutional quality. 
3.3  A new measure: property insecurity of minority groups 
This study presents an alternative Property Insecurity Index, specifically designed to 
evaluate the security of property rights enjoyed or not enjoyed by marginalized groups, 
rather than foreign investors and domestic elites. The Property Insecurity Index is a 
composite index based on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database. 
 
The MAR database, generated by the University of Maryland's Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, assesses the political and economic exclusion 
of ethno-cultural minorities in every country with a population of at least 500,000 
(Center for International Development and Conflict Management 2009). Experts assign 
a numerical score indicating the severity of exclusion to each group along an array of 
political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. A ‘minority at risk’ is defined as ‘an 
ethnopolitical group (non-state communal group) that collectively suffers, or benefits 
from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or 
collectively mobilizes in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests.’ The 
following four variables identify the factors present in the group which make it a 
minority at risk: (1) the group is subject to discrimination at present; (2) the group is 
disadvantaged due to past discrimination; (3) the group is an advantaged minority; and 
(4) the group supports political organizations advocating greater group rights. Groups 
are included in the MAR database if the group has a population larger than 100,000 or 
greater than one per cent of a country’s population. 
 
The Property Insecurity Index is a composite measure of the property insecurity 
experienced by each minority group in every country included in the MAR database. 
The property insecurity score for each group is based on MAR scores in three 
dimensions: dispossession from land, forced internal resettlement, and internal 
resettlement by policy. Like the ICRG and Heritage Foundation indices, the Property 
Insecurity Index measures the de facto, rather than de jure, protection from 
expropriation experienced by ethnocultural minority groups. The index detects state 
failure to protect the property rights of minority groups from incursions by other 
(possibly more powerful and influential) private actors, as well as direct state acts of 9 
 
expropriation. Country  property insecurity  scores are generated by aggregating the 
property insecurity scores of all minority groups within each country.  
 
There are three versions of the Property Insecurity Index. The first, Property Insecurity 
(Weighted), is a sum of group property insecurities weighted by the group’s proportion 
of the country population. The second, Property Insecurity (Max), reflects the property 
insecurity of the worst-off group in a country. The third, Property Insecurity (Mean) 
reflects the average property insecurity score of minority groups within a country. All 
three versions are compared to the ICRG and Heritage Foundation Indices in Section 4. 
Property Insecurity (Max) is then used to examine the relation between property 
insecurity for marginalized groups and long-run development, as this measure best 
captures the most severe property insecurity faced by any group in a country. 
 
Property insecurity for Group G = Pg = (evictiong + forced_resettleg + 
resettle_policyg)/3 
Property insecurity for Country I (Weighted) = PIi = Σ(gprog)Pg 
Property insecurity for Country I (Max) = PIi = Pworst 
Property insecurity for Country I (Mean) = PIi = Average(Pg) 
 
Where gprog = group’s proportion of the population, evictiong = dispossession from 
land, forced_resettleg  = forced internal resettlement, and resettle_policyg  = internal 
resettlement by policy. 
 
Group discrimination and bias are evaluated relative to other groups within the country. 
Therefore if property rights are uniformly insecure for all groups in a country, or if the 
general population suffers from insecure property rights but no groups are present in the 
country that are categorized as ethno-cultural minorities by the MAR definition, then 
the country will receive a score equivalent to zero property insecurity, although this 
does not reflect secure property rights for all. 
 
This Property Insecurity  Index departs fundamentally from other measures of 
institutional quality in two ways. First, it relies on data sources that assess the 
experience of the worst-off populations in a country—precisely those who are 
supposedly the intended targets of economic development initiatives. And second, it 
explicitly aims to capture and aggregate the experience of many groups within a single 
country, rather than attempting to present an overall country measure of the average 
level of institutional quality supposedly experienced by everyone. In this sense, the 
conceptual starting point of the property insecurity measure is that a single indicator of 
property rights (or ‘institutional quality’ more broadly) may potentially efface 
heterogeneity in rights enjoyment; an index that measures only averages, or the situation 
of elites, or both, inherently cannot detect variations in the experiences of different 
groups. 
4   Comparing indices 10 
 
4.1  ICRG and Heritage Foundation property rights indices versus Property 
Insecurity Index 
The basic question of whether or not aggregate cross-country indices of property rights 
security reflect the property rights enjoyed by ethnocultural minorities can be answered 
empirically by examining the degree to which widely used measures of property rights 
institutions correlate with the security of property rights enjoyed by minority groups. If 
property rights are homogenous within countries, as implicitly assumed in the cross-
country institutions and development research, then all measures of property rights 
security would be highly correlated—with any correlation less than one reflecting only 
the measurement error generated by the assignation of scores through subjective 
evaluation. The ICRG index and the Heritage Foundation Index should therefore be 
highly and positively correlated with each other, and both should be inversely related to 
the Property Insecurity Index. If instead property rights are indeed enjoyed 
heterogeneously by different groups with the same country, but the aggregate property 
rights indices are still reflecting the rights enjoyed by ethnocultural minorities—as 
opposed to simply measuring the rights enjoyment of foreign investors and domestic 
elites—then the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation property rights indices should be 
highly and inversely related to the Weighted Property Insecurity Index, and weakly and 
inversely related to the Mean Property Insecurity Index. 
 
The empirical evidence instead suggests both (a) that property rights are indeed 
heterogeneous, and (b) that existing widely used, cross-country indices of property 
rights fail to consider the property security of marginalized minorities at all. Although 
the Heritage Foundation and the ICRG measures indeed correspond highly with each 
other, neither are at related to any of the measures of property rights enjoyed by 
minority groups. These results are below in Tables 2 and 3, which show Kendall's rank 
correlation coefficients for the different property rights measures. The data availability 
for the Heritage Foundation and the ICRG measure differ, so Table 1 takes the years 
available for the ICRG Index as the baseline dataset, while Table 2 takes the years 
available for the Heritage Foundation Index as the baseline dataset. Kendall’s 
coefficient is the appropriate measure of correlation because the data is not normally 
distributed—the Heritage Foundation and ICRG measures are left-skewed, while the 
Property Insecurity Index has a large number of zero value observations and is therefore 
right-skewed. Unlike Pearson’s correlation coefficient, the Kendall coefficient does not 
assume normality. And unlike Spearman’s coefficient, Kendall’s coefficient is robust to 
‘ties’, i.e., identical values for different observations. Regardless of the time period, the 
correlation between the two aggregate measures of property security for elites and 
foreign investors—the ICRG and Heritage Foundation Indices—is very high. In 
contrast, there is no relationship whatsoever between the property rights of marginalized 
minorities and the ICRG or Heritage Foundation measures. The scatter plot graphs 
(Figures 1 and 2) following the correlation tables further illustrate that the lack of any 














Europe AJR  Sample 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) (10) 
Log GDP per capita (PPP) 
in 1995 
8.37  9.45  7.30  8.35 8.45 7.24 8.62  10.33  9.47 8.07 
(1.27)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.29) (0.20) (0.14) (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.14) (0.15) 
Log GDP per capita (PPP) 
in 2005 
8.64  9.74  7.54  8.42 8.78 7.48 8.84  10.55  9.80 8.26 
(1.30)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.32) (0.19) (0.15) (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.11) (0.15) 
HDI Score, 1995-2000  0.69  0.84  0.55  0.75 0.71 0.50 0.74  0.94  0.86 0.64 
(0.18)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.02) 
HDI Score, 2005  0.73  0.86  0.59  0.75 0.75 0.53 0.80  0.96  0.89 0.67 
(0.18)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.02) 
ICRG Property Rights, 
1985-95 
7.06  8.18  6.00  7.32 7.06 5.77 6.39  9.87  9.14 6.54 
(1.85)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (1.57) (0.28) (0.21) (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.18) (0.18) 
Heritage Foundation  
Property Rights,                    
1995-2004 
50.76  63.23  39.50  64.40 47.09 40.56 50.13  90  63.20 49.70 
(22.69)  (2.47)  (1.53)  (10.55)  (3.62) (2.21) (3.73)  (0.00)  (3.77) (2.46) 
Property Insecurity 
Weighted, 1985-95 
1.22  1.19  1.26  1.05 1.26 1.17 1.46  1.02  1.01 1.30 
(0.55)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.20)  (0.02)  (0.01) (0.09) 
Property Insecurity Mean, 
1985-95 
2.01  1.88  2.14  1.60 2.24 1.49 3.10  1.25  1.72 2.20 
(1.50)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.56) (0.29) (0.16) (0.44)  (0.25)  (0.23) (0.21) 
Property Insecurity Max, 
1985-95 
2.64  2.47  2.79  1.56 3.16 1.92 3.38  1.75  2.59 2.89 
(2.10)  (0.25)  (0.30)  (0.56) (0.41) (0.27) (0.44)  (0.75)  (0.49) (0.29) 
Property Insecurity 
Weighted, 1995-2003 
1.18  1.11  1.17  1.00 1.28 1.23 1.10  1.03  1.10 1.10 
(0.59)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.00) (0.12) (0.14) (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) 
Property Insecurity Mean, 
1995-2003 
1.79  1.81  1.66  1.29 1.97 1.70 2.37  1.40  1.30 1.81 
(1.26)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.15) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26)  (0.40)  (0.09) (0.15) 
Property Insecurity Max, 
1995-2003 
2.35  2.31  2.17  1.31 2.76 2.12 3.01  2.19  1.70 2.40 
(1.79)  (0.25)  (0.20)  (0.15) (0.38) (0.32) (0.34)  (1.19)  (0.22) (0.22) 
Countries  198  87  87  14 49 53 37  2  42 64 
Notes: Values are averages during sample period, with standard deviations in parentheses. Columns 2 and 3 split the sample in column 1 by the median income during the relevant period (from the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators 2008) in the sample in column 1.  The ICRG property rights index is the 0 to 10 scaled ICRG/IRIS version used by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). 
Source: Author’s computations. 12 
 
Table 2: Correlations: 1985-95 
   ICRG       
Property 





















Correlation  1             
N  83             
Heritage 
Foundation  
Property Rights,   
1995-2004 
Correlation  0.517*  1          





Correlation  -0.142  -0.043  1       




Correlation  -0.108  -0.083  0.582*  1    




Correlation  -0.116  -0.132  0.566*  0.801*  1 
N  83  83  83  83  83 
Notes: Property Insecurity Weighted is the sum of group property insecurity scores, weighted by their proportion of the 
population; Property Insecurity Maximum is the property insecurity score of the worst off group; Property Insecurity 
Mean is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores.  * represents significance at the five per cent level. 
Source: Author’s computations. 
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Table 3: Correlations: 1995-2004 
    Heritage 
Foundation  
Property 
Rights,          
1995-2004 
ICRG       
Property 



















Property Rights,    
1995-2004 
Correlation  1         
  N  89         
ICRG Property 
Rights, 1985-95 
Correlation  0.526*  1       





Correlation  -0.023  -0.068  1     




Correlation  -0.143  -0.098  0.662*  1   




Correlation  -0.161*  -0.087  0.680*  0.880*  1 
  N  89  89  89  89  89 
Notes: Property Insecurity Weighted is the sum of group property insecurity scores, weighted by their proportion of the 
population; Property Insecurity Maximum is the property insecurity score of the worst off group; Property Insecurity 
Mean is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores. * represents significance at the five per cent level. 
Phase IV release of the MAR dataset includes data from 1945-2003. 










Source: Author’s computations. 
 
4.2  Economic development 
This section tests the hypotheses that the political and economic implications of secure 
property rights depend on whose property rights are secure, and that the security of 
property rights for marginalized minorities is irrelevant for long-run economic 
development.   
 
A generalized least squares (GLS) model with bootstrapped standard errors is used to 
regress log per capita income on the indices of property rights from the ICRG, the 
Heritage Foundation, and the new measures of property insecurity. The results are 
reported in Table 4.  
 
The non-parametric approach of bootstrapped standard errors was adopted because the 
empirical distribution of the primary variable of interest—property insecurity—does not 
meet parametric assumptions, and there is no a priori theoretical reason to assume any 
particular asymptotic population distribution.  Therefore, in order to accurately assess 
statistical significance a technique, which is applicable regardless of the form of the 
data’s probability density function, had to be utilized. Bootstrapping entails estimating 
the sampling distribution by sampling with replacement from the original data, and 
allows hypothesis testing based on the empirical population distribution, even when data 
is non-parametric and violates common assumptions regarding continuity or parametric 
families (Efron and Tibshirani 1984). The results in Table 4 are based on re-sampling 
with replacement 1000 times. 
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The linear regression 
s are for the equation: 
 
log yi  = α + βPi + µXi + єi          (1) 
 
where yi  is GDP per capita in country i, Pi is the property rights measure, Xi is a vector 
of covariates, and єi is the random error term. The coefficient of interest is β, which 
measures the effect of property security and insecurity on per capita income. An 
alternative specification, where the outcome of interest is the composite Human 
Development Index (HDI), from the UNDP Human Development Reports Office, is 
also examined. The Human Development Index is an average of life expectancy, 
literacy rates plus gross school enrolment, and log per capita income. 
 
The property insecurity scores are the average from 1985 to 2003, the most recent time 
period for which MAR data was available for group dispossession from land, forced 
internal resettlement, and internal resettlement by policy. The ICRG Property Rights 
index is the average for 1985 to 1995, the time period available in the IRIS data and 
widely used in previous studies (Knack and Keefer 1995; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; 
Boschiniet al. 2007; Djankov and Reynal-Querol 2007; Mehlum et al. 2006). Heritage 
Foundation property rights scores are the average for the ten year period beginning in 
1995, the first year for which data is available. Dependent variables are for 2005 to 
mitigate the possibility of reverse causality. Regional dummies are based on 
classifications from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This 
approach was adopted because the conventional choice for regional dummies—the 
World Bank’s regional classifications—is endogenous, as the World Bank regions 
themselves are defined on the basis of per capita income (Easterly 2007). 
 
The large sample, cross-country GLS regression results in Table 4 reaffirm robust 
previous findings of a strong correlation between long-run development and security of 
property rights for foreign investors and domestic elites, but show no relationship 
between the property insecurity of marginalized minority groups and either GDP per 
capita or HDI. Countries in which segments of the population suffer from severe 
property insecurity often have relatively high levels of per capita income and high 
achievement in terms of human development outcomes, reflecting steady economic 
growth rates since 1500. Note that because different samples are used across the 
different property security and insecurity variables—due to differences in data 
availability—results may not be strictly comparable across models. 
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Table 4a:  Large sample cross-sectional GLS regressions of long-run development: dependent variable: log per capita GDP, 2005 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Property Rights (ICRG),     
1985-1995 




                       
Property Rights (Heritage 
Foundation), 1995-2004           0.041*** 
(0) 
0.031***  
(0)                   
Ln Property Insecurity 
Mean, 1985-2003                 0.03     
(0.22) 
-0.037        
(0.25)             
Ln Property Insecurity 
Max, 1985-2003                       0.01              
(0.01) 
-0.074             
(-0.17)       
Ln Property Insecurity 
Weighted, 1985-2003 
                           -0.632          
(0.52) 
-0.25           
(0.38) 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean dummy 
-1.717*        
(0.68)     -0.252         
(0.39)     -0.573       
(0.58)     -1.815**     
(0.62)     -1.802**           
(0.61)     -1.795***  
(0.61) 
Asia dummy  -1.769*      
(0.71)     -0.252         
(0.39)     -0.54      
(0.57)     -1.934**     
(0.62)     -1.930**           
(0.62)     -1.917**              
(0.62) 
Africa dummy  -3.073***   
(0.69)     -1.334**        
(0.44)     -1.567**   
(0.57)     -3.272***      
(0.61)     -3.280***         
(0.61)     -3.202***            
(0.6) 
Europe dummy  -0.754        
(0.68)     -0.132         
(0.32)     0.065        
(0.56)     -1.017        
(0.61)     -1.023        
(0.61)     -1.012            
(0.6) 
Oceania dummy  -2.134**   
(0.74)     -0.734         
(0.63)     -0.836       
(0.65)     -1.459           
(0.91)     -1.478           
(0.86)     -1.463                 
(0.85) 
R
2  0.435  0.581  0.683  0.471  0.667  0  0.507  0  0.508  0.016  0.497 
Number of observations  178  120  120  157  157  112  112  112  112  110  110 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4b:  Large sample cross-sectional GLS regressions of long-run development: dependent variable: HDI score, 2005 
 
Property Rights (ICRG),     
1985-1995   
0.079***           
(0.01) 
0.047***          
(0.01)                 
Property Rights (Heritage 
Foundation), 1995-2004       
0.005***         
(0) 
0.003***        
(0)             
Property Insecurity Mean, 
1985-2003           
0.012       
(0.03) 
-0.017          
(0.02)         
Property Insecurity Max, 
1985-2003               
0.008           
(0.02) 
-0.016             
(0.02)     
Property Insecurity 
Weighted, 1985-2003                   
-0.088       
(0.07) 
-0.041         
(0.04) 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean dummy 
-0.164*     
(0.07)   
-0.011             
(0.07)   
-0.054       
(0.07)   
-0.168*       
(0.07)   
-0.171**      
(0.06)   
-0.172**             
(0.06) 
Asia dummy  -0.208**    
(0.07)   
-0.051           
(0.07)   
-0.079           
(0.07)   
-0.211**         
(0.07)   
-0.212**           
(0.07)   
-0.211***            
(0.06) 
Africa dummy  -0.426***  
(0.07)   
-0.247***         
(0.07)   
-0.289***   
(0.07)   
-0.454***    
(0.07)   
-0.456***     
(0.06)   
-0.448***            
(0.06) 
Europe dummy  -0.069       
(0.07)   
-0.007             
(0.06)   
0.01           
(0.07)   
-0.093           
(0.06)   
-0.095             
(0.06)   
-0.093          
(0.06) 
Oceania dummy  -0.209*     
(0.09)   
-0.094      
(0.094)   
-0.093         
(0.08)   
-0.161           
(0.11)   
-0.166         
(0.11)   
-0.162              
(0.12) 
R
2  0.613  0.53  0.752  0.362  0.748  0.001  0.684  0.001  0.685  0.016  0.674 
Number of observations  173  120  120  156  156  110  110  110  110  108  108 
Notes: Dependent variables are log GDP per capita (PPP) and the Human Development Index score. Property Rights (ICRG) is the 0 to 10 scaled version from IRIS where a higher score means 
more protection against expropriation. Property Insecurity Weighted is the sum of minority group insecurity weighted by the group’s proportion of the population; Property Insecurity Max is the 
property insecurity score for the worst-off group in a country; Property Insecurity Mean is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores. Higher property insecurity scores indicate higher 
levels of property insecurity (the inverse of the property rights indicator). The omitted continent dummy is for North America. All property insecurity scores are logged to base ‘e’. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the one per cent, five per cent and ten per cent levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s computations. 19 
 
The failure to find a significant relationship between property insecurity and GDP per 
capita or HDI means only that the standard for rejecting the null hypothesis was not 
met. It does not mean we can conclude that there is definitely no relationship between 
property insecurity and long-run economic development, as it would take an infinite 
amount of evidence to actually prove the null hypothesis of no relationship. However, 
we can evaluate the probability that a significant effect was likely to be detected given 
hypothesized effect size, number of variables and sample size. 
 
Therefore we provide here an assessment of the likelihood of a Type II error. A Type II 
error occurs when the null hypothesis is false but a statistical test fails to reject it. Here a 
Type II error would exist if the null hypothesis—that property insecurity is irrelevant 
for long-run development—were in fact false, but our econometric model still indicated 
no significant relationship between development level and a country’s degree of 
property insecurity—thereby failing to reject the null hypothesis, even though it is false.  
 
The probability of a Type II error is symbolized by β. To find β, a hypothesized R
2 of 
the model including a property insecurity indicator is compared with the R
2 of the model 
including only the control variables (effect size = E), given the number of observations 
(N), the number of variables in the full model (V), the number of test variables (T), and 






r            (2)
 
P(Type II Error) = β          ( 3 )
 
β (E, N, V, T, α)           ( 4 )  
 
Table 5 shows the number of observations required for Type II error likelihoods of less 
than or equal to five per cent (β = .05) and 10 per cent (β = .1), for a hypothesized effect 
of in R
2 = 0.05 and R
2 = 0.10, in our model with six variables, across the ranges of R
2 
values encountered in the large sample GLS regressions shown in Table 4, at a 
significance level of α = 0.10. Because lower values of α increase the likelihood that an 
econometric model will fail to reject a null hypothesis even if false, a ten per cent 
significance level is applied (the highest α-value commonly used in the literature), in 
order to apply a stringent standard against a Type II error.  
 
Table 5 illustrates that the likelihood of Type II error is very low for all our regression 




r = 0.1, at all relevant R
2 values.  
β < .05 for a hypothesized effect of E = 0.5 at all but the lowest bounds of the R
2 range. 
In other words, for all models, at even a small hypothesized effect the likelihood of a 
Type II error is less than 10 per cent, while for a slightly larger hypothesized effect the 
likelihood falls to five per cent or less. 
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r  β = .05  β  = .1  β = .05  β  = .1 
0.400 - 0.350  N=132  N=104     
0.400 - 0.300      N=68  N=52 
0.500 - 0.450  N=112  N=88     
0.500 - 0.400      N=56  N=44 
0.600 - 0.550  N=88  N=70     
0.600 - 0.500      N=44  N=36 
0.700 - 0.650  N=68  N=52    
0.700 - 0.600      N=34 N=28 
Notes: V = 6; α = 0.10; Hypothesized change in R2 = 0.05; Hypothesized change in R2 = 0.10. 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
The base sample used by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) in their well-known paper, 
arguing that institutional quality is a fundamental determinant of economic 
development, is limited to 64 ex-colonies for which data is available on settler 
mortality. I use this limited sample and reproduce their OLS specification to examine 
the impact of property insecurity within the same universe of observations and using the 
same regression strategy, so that findings can be directly compared. Here the Property 
Insecurity Index covers the period 1985 to 1995, the same time frame as the ICRG 
property rights measure, and the continent dummies, latitude control and year for the 
per capita GDP dependent variable are also the same as those used by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001, 2002). Once again, the results in Table 6 indicate no relationship between 
property insecurity of marginalized minorities and long-run economic development. 21 
 
Table 6: AJR sample: OLS regressions of long-run development 
Dependent Variable:  Log per capita GDP, 1995 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
Property Rights 
(ICRG),  1985-95 
0.52***      
(0.06) 




0.40***      
( 0 . 0 6 )                  
     
Property Insecurity 
Weighted,  1985-95      
0.17       
(0.68) 
0.18       
(0.61) 
0.40         
(0.50) 
0.37         
(0.47)          
     
Property Insecurity 
Max,  1985-95             
-0.08      
(0.32) 
-0.06       
(0.29) 
-0.22        
(0.25) 
-0.23      
(0.24)    
     
Property Insecurity 
Mean,  1985-95                    
0.18       
(0.46) 
0.15          
(0.41) 
-0.60     
(0.38) 




1.71**       
(0.72)  
0.98          
(0.64)  
3.55**
*     
(0.97) 
 
2.00**   
(0.81)  
3.55***    
(0.97)  
2.02**       
(0.80)  
3.55***     
(0.97) 






-.65***     
(0.24)    
-0.75**   
(0.32) 
-.64**     
(0.31)    
-0.71**  
(0.32) 
-.60*          
(0.31)    
-0.78**  
(0.31) 






-0.88***     
(0.17)    
-1.39*** 
(0.23) 
-1.27***   
(0.23)    
-1.43*** 
(0.24) 
-1.31***   
(0.23)    
-1.56*** 
(0.26) 
-1.44***   
(0.25) 
“Other” continent 
dummy    
0.22   
(0.39) 
0.10          
(0.39)    
1.24**  
(0.57) 
0.88         
(0.56)    
1.09*   
(0.58) 
0.72          
(0.57)    
0.93     
(0.58) 
0.58          
(0.57) 
R
2  0.52 0.56 0.69 0.71 0.001  0.21  0.50  0.56 0.001  0.21 0.50 0.56 0.003  0.21 0.52 0.58 
No  of  observations  64 64 64 64 53  53  53  53 53  53 53 53 53  53 53 53 
Dependent Variable:  HDI Score, 1995-2000 
Property Rights 








( 0 . 0 1 )                  
     
Property Insecurity 
Weighted, 1985-95         
0.0005   
(0.12) 




0.04         
(0.070)            
     
Property Insecurity 





-0.04   
(0.04) 
-0.04   
(.04)    
     
Property Insecurity 
Mean,    1985-95                   
0.08   
(0.08) 





























(.04)    
-0.12**   
(0.05) 
-0.11**     














(0.03)    
-0.29*** 
(0.03) 
-0.28***   










dummy    
0.02   
(0.06) 
0.02  
(0.06)    
0.17**  
(0.08) 
0.14         
(0.08)    
0.15*  
(0.08) 
0.11   
(0.08)    
0.13  
(0.08) 
0.09     
(0.08) 
R
2  0.47 0.49  0.76  0.76 0.00  0.15 0.66 0.68 0.0002  0.15 0.66  0.68  0.02  0.17 0.67 0.69 
No  of  observations  64 64  64  64 53  53 53 53 53  53 53  53  53  53 53 53 
Notes: Dependent variables are log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 and the Human Development Index score from 1995 to 2000. Property rights (ICRG) is the 0 to 10 scaled version used by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001, 2002), where a higher score means more protection against expropriation. Property Insecurity Weighted is the sum of minority group insecurity weighted by the group’s proportion of the population; 
Property Insecurity Max is the property insecurity score for the worst-off group in a country; Property Insecurity Mean is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores. Higher property insecurity 
scores indicate higher levels of property insecurity (the inverse of the ICRG Property Rights indicator). The omitted continent dummy is for America. Base sample includes countries with data for settler 
mortality and all variables. All property insecurity scores are logged to base ‘e’. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the one per cent, five per cent and ten per 
cent levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s computations. 22 
 
The Acemoglu et al. (2001) article is well-known not for its finding of a simple 
correlation between expropriation risk and per capita income, as such a correlation 
could be explained by reverse causality and omitted variables, but because it used settler 
mortality as an instrumental variable to predict institutional quality, in an attempt to 
avoid these endogeneity problems.1 Arguing that low settler mortality rates and sparse 
pre-colonial populations encouraged settlers to replicate European institutions with 
strong private property rights and checks against government power—while colonial 
disease environments and factor endowments that favoured the establishment of 
extractive industries generated higher degrees of inequality, less accountable political 
institutions, and ultimately less secure property rights for the majority of the 
population—Acemoglu et al. (2001) show a strong and significant relationship between 
settler mortality and the ICRG property rights indicator. 
 
The two-staged least squares estimates used by Acemoglu et al. (2001) treat property 
rights security, Pi, as endogenous, and are model as 
 
First stage:     Pi = α + βlogMi + µXi + єi``     (5) 
Second stage:    log yi = α + βPi + µXi + єi     (6) 
 
where M is the settler mortality rate and Xi is a vector of covariates. 
 
The theoretical relationship underlying this instrumental variable strategy suggests that 
settler mortality rates should also predict the property insecurity of ethno-cultural 
minorities. Theoretically, settler mortality rates are thought to effect institutions through 
the structure of production, where high settler mortality rates favoured the establishment 
of extensive extraction economies that relied on concentrated capital and the 
employment of low-skilled workers—ultimately producing property rights institutions 
that favoured elites—while low settler mortality led to broadly egalitarian land 
distribution and small-scale self-employment—which ultimately engendered the 
widespread enjoyment of secure property rights. 
 
I re-estimate the first stage of this instrumental variable relationship using property 
insecurity as the property rights measure, based on the original settler mortality data 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001). Results are shown in Table 7, Panels C to E. In almost all 
specifications the first stage relationship between settler mortality and property rights 
disappears when we substitute in any measure of property insecurity, and in the models 
where the relationship is statistically significant the sign is the opposite of what we 
would expect if low settler mortality rates indeed facilitated the widespread enjoyment 
of property rights security by everyone, including marginalized minority groups. 
                                                 
1 For critiques of this instrumental variable strategy, see Albouy (2004), disputing the validity of the 
settler mortality data; McArthur and Sachs (2001), arguing that settler mortality fails to meet the 
exclusion restriction because disease environment impacts development directly; and Glaeser et al. 
(2004), contending that education and culture drives development rather than institutions and the density 
of European settlement is correlated with these factors. 23 
 
Table 7: AJR sample: IV regressions of log GDP per capita 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Expropriation Risk (ICRG)  0.93***  0.96***  0.97***  1.07***                         
(1.54) (0.21) (0.28) (0.42)             
Property Insecurity Weighted          16.61  11.70  4.80**  3.82**                 
 (11.85)  (7.60)  (2.15)  (1.77)           
Property  Insecurity  Max              7.93  5.38  5.27  4.24         
   (5.80)  (3.48)  (4.76)  (3.84)         
Property  Insecurity  Mean                      14.00  10.42  1230.25  283.45 
                        (12.11) (8.59) (156134.8) (10106.02) 
Latitude    -0.42    -0.99  3.65   1.85*   3.97  1.78  3.16    6.96 
 (1.27)  (1.60)  2.70  (1.11)  (2.70)    (2.19)    (3.45)    (195.98) 
Asia  dummy     -1.00***  -1.10**     -0.58  -0.52     -2.09  -1.73     40.44  9.10 
(0.38)  (0.48)  (0.50)  (0.43)  (1.55)  (1.28)    (5230.66)  (349.26) 
Africa  dummy      -0.47  -0.45     -1.44***  -1.32***    (-0.35)  -0.44      365.39  83.54 
(0.34) (0.39)  (0.36) (0.31)  1.18 (0.96)      (46548.08)  (3023.70) 
“Other”  continent  dummy      -0.92  -0.95     1.69*  1.26      4.00  3.13     553.84  127.29 
(0.81) (0.91)  (0.90) (0.79)  (3.08)  (2.56)      (70137.99)  (4508.67) 
R
2  0.19 0.14 0.23 0.06  ..  ..  ..  0.06  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Number  of  observations  64 64 64 64  53  53  53 53  53  53  53  53  53  53  53  53 
Panel B: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk, 1985-1995 
Log European Settler Mortality  -0.61***  -0.52***  -0.44**  -0.35*                         
(0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18)             
Latitude    2.01    2.00                    
(1.33)  (1.38)             
Asia  dummy      0.33  0.47                    
(0.50) (0.50)             
Africa  dummy      -0.27  -0.26                    
(0.41) (0.41)             
“Other”  continent  dummy      1.23  1.05                    
(0.84) (0.84)             
R
2  0.27 0.30 0.31 0.33                   
Number of observations  64  64  64  64                         
Continued on next page 
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 Table 7 Continued  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
Panel C: First Stage for Property Insecurity Weighted, 1985-1995 
Log European Settler Mortality 
    
-0.03 -0.04 -0.08** -0.09*** 
     (0.02) (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Latitude 
      
-0.18 -0.17 
     (0.24) (0.25) 
Asia dummy 
        
-0.06 -0.07 
     (0.09) (0.09) 
Africa dummy 
        
0.11 0.11 
     (0.07) (0.07) 
“Other” continent dummy 
        
-0.27 -0.25 
     0.17 (0.17) 
R
2 0.04  0.05  0.14  0.15 
Number of observations  53  53  53  53 
Panel D: First Stage for Property Insecurity Max, 1985-1995 
Log European Settler Mortality 
          
-0.07 -0.09  -0.07  -0.08 
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Latitude 








              
-0.10 -0.10 
(0.15) (0.15) 
“Other” continent dummy 




2  0.04 0.05  0.18  0.19 
Number of observations  53 53  53  53 
Panel E: First Stage for Property Insecurity Mean, 1985-1995 
Log European Settler Mortality 
          
-0.04 -0.05 -0.0003  -0.001 
(0.03) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Latitude 








              
-0.30*** -0.30*** 
(0.10) (0.10) 
“Other” continent dummy 




2  0.01 0.03  0.24  0.24 
Number of observations  53 53  53  53 
Notes: All Property Insecurity scores are logged to base ‘e’. ***, ** and * represent significance at the one per cent, five per cent and ten per cent levels respectively. Instrumental variable is settler mortality 
from Acemoglu et al. 2001. Source: Author’s computations. 25 
 
The three property insecurity indices reflect the institutional framework experienced by 
marginalized minorities, while the ICRG and Heritage Foundation property rights indices 
measure the property security of foreign investors and domestic elites. The divergent results in 
both the GLS and IV specifications using these different indices confirm that they are 
measuring distinct dimensions of property rights security, corroborating the existence of 
heterogeneity in property rights enjoyment between groups within countries. 
 
These findings also confirm the hypothesis that the relationship between property rights and 
economic development depends on whose property rights are secure, and that the security of 
property rights for marginalized minorities is irrelevant for long-run economic development. 
Economic growth can occur when the property rights of elites and foreign investors are secure 
but vulnerable minorities face a high a risk of expropriation, possibly because resources are 
being reallocated into the hands of investors with better access to complementary production 
inputs. Moreover, if one pathway through which secure private property rights leads to 
economic growth is by increasing government accountability—as the ‘macro’ theories 
regarding liberty, secure property rights, democracy and public goods provision suggest—
then the findings here also indicate that a more nuanced understanding of the role played by 
private property rights in constraining the power of elites is required. Because the ICRG index 
measures the security of the property of elites and large investors, while the Property 
Insecurity Index is sensitive to the risk of expropriation faced by less powerful ethno-cultural 
minorities, one might predict that property insecurity would be a more appropriate proxy for 
constraints on elites than the ICRG measure. However, the absence of a relationship between 
property insecurity and long-run economic development indicates that secure property rights 
for ethno-cultural minorities are not necessary for the kind of government accountability that 
incentivizes the adoption of growth-enhancing economic policies. 
5   Conclusion 
I haven't time to tell you what emotions we experience in traversing this 
half-wild, half-civilized country, in which fifty years ago were to be found 
numerous and powerful nations who have disappeared from the earth, or 
who have been pushed back into still more distant forests; a country where 
are to be seen, rising with prodigious rapidity, new peoples and brilliant 
cities which pitilessly take the place of the unhappy Indians too feeble to 
resist them. Half a century ago the name of the Iroquois, of the Mohawks, 
their tribes, their power filled these regions, and now hardly the memory of 
them remains. Their majestic forests are falling everyday; civilized nations 
are established on the ruins... 
 
(Pierson 1938) Gustave de Beaumont, New York, 1830. 
 
The history of development on every continent is rife with examples of the role played by 
power in determining whose property rights are made secure and insecure under de facto legal 
institutions, and the considerable heterogeneity of property rights security enjoyed by 
different groups in the same country. Capitalist economic development has often involved the 
expropriation of property from marginalized groups and the reallocation of these valuable 26 
 
resources into the hands of elites with access to the knowledge and capital necessary for 
efficient exploitation. 
 
The dispossession of Native Americans from their land was a necessary prerequisite for the 
expansion of large plantations and the widespread establishment of small freehold farms for 
white settlers throughout the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Approximately 100,000 Native Americans had their eastern homelands seized during the 
nineteenth century (Thornton 1984). The Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek and 
Seminole suffered wholesale legal expropriation, and were forcibly removed to marginal land 
by the Indian Removal Act of 1830. 14,000 Cherokee men, women and children were 
marched overland, at gunpoint, by the U.S. Army in the summer of 1938. 4,000 died from 
inclement weather, mistreatment by soldiers, inadequate food and disease (Thornton 1984). 
The widely lauded secure private property rights, enjoyed by yeoman American farmers in the 
nineteenth century (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997: 260-304, 2002), were made possible by the 
property insecurity of Native Americans. 
 
The enclosure of the commons in seventeenth century Britain—broadly acknowledged to 
have reduced overgrazing and increased agricultural investments on newly enclosed land—
improved the property rights security of the landed elites but reduced the property rights of 
small and medium cottagers who previously had rights to the newly enclosed commons 
(Yelling 1977; Sharman 1989). Increasing the security of private property rights for the gentry 
required expropriating the property of small hold farmers and pastoralists. As Davis (2004) 
notes, property rights security for some actors entailed property insecurity for others. 
 
The criminal law of eighteenth century Britain further strengthened the property rights claims 
of landed elites and eroded customary use rights traditionally enjoyed by labourers and 
yeomen. The Black Act of 1723 created 50 new capital offenses punishable by hanging, 
directed at ‘crimes’ such as deer stealing, breaking the heads of fishponds and cutting down 
young trees (Thompson 1975). The complex web of usufruct rights in the forest—in which 
the rights to harvest trees and berries, hunt deer and clear land for agriculture were shared 
among many parties and determined by season and status2—was crystallized into clear cut 
freehold titles that vested in the landed gentry (Thompson 1975). By redefining crimes as an 
offense against property, rather than against another person, the Black Act allowed law to 
cloak itself in impartiality—masking the power relations underlying the allocation and 
enforcement of property rights entitlements. 
 
In the contemporary context, Brazil is a well known example of an upper middle income 
country with a high level of property insecurity for marginalized groups but also strong 
property rights protections for elites and foreign investors. Brazil’s GDP per capita in 2005 
was US$8,505 (PPP), while its ICRG property rights score (1985-95) was 7.9—higher than 
the world mean of 7.06—while its Property Insecurity Mean and Property Insecurity Max 
scores for the same period also both fell in the upper fiftieth percentile. Brazil currently 
obtains between 75 and 90 per cent of its energy from hydroelectric power (PBS n.d.)—a 
production structure that requires the construction and operation of hydroelectric dams for 
                                                 
2 See Maine (1861) for the canonical description of the progression of Western law from status to contract  (‘Not 
many of us are so unobservant as not to perceive that in innumerable cases where old law fixed a man's social 
position irreversibly at his birth, modern law allows him to create it for himself by convention…’).   27 
 
continued growth. Since 1985, over 50,000 indigenous and local residents have been 
displaced and resettled due to dam construction, with a majority of resettled households left 
worse-off than they had been prior to dam construction (Scudder and Gay 2005). The process 
of aggregate economic growth and simultaneous property insecurity for marginalized 
minorities in Brazil is ongoing. In 2010 the government approved construction of the world's 
third largest hydroelectric power plant on the Xingu River, a large tributary of the Amazon. 
Projected to generate 11,000 megawatts, the Belo Monte dam will provide power for Brazil's 
fast-growing economy while displacing approximately 20,000-40,000 indigenous Amazonian 
Indians (PBS n.d.). 
 
The complexity of property rights has been inadequately considered in recent macro-level 
research regarding property rights and economic development. Property rights have instead 
been conceptualized in a formal rather than a realist framework, based on the implicit 
assumption that rights enjoyment is uniform across a society. The cross-national indices of 
property rights widely used in the economics research literature—initially designed to assess 
the risk of expropriation faced by international businesses—fail to adequately account for the 
institutional framework encountered by marginalized minority groups.  
 
In fact, as this study shows, members of marginalized groups often face significantly higher 
property insecurity than foreign investors and domestic elites. In many countries strongly 
secure property rights for some coexists alongside insecure property rights for others. Existing 
research ignores the significant variation in the risk of expropriation faced by different ethnic, 
cultural and religious groups in the same country.  
 
Although it has been widely argued that secure private property rights are a prerequisite for 
economic development, it actually matters  whose property rights are secure. When 
heterogeneity in property rights enjoyment is considered, the results demonstrate that property 
insecurity of marginalized minorities does not reduce long-run growth. These findings are 
important and thought provoking as they challenge widely held assumptions regarding the 
relationship between property rights and economic development. At a micro-level, growth can 
occur when the property rights of elites are secure but marginalized minorities face a high risk 
of expropriation, because resources may be reallocated into the hands of investors with access 
to knowledge, capital, and other complementary production inputs. And at a macro-level, 
secure property rights for marginalized minorities are not required to incentivize governments 
to adopt broadly growth-enhancing economic policies, as security of property rights for elites 
can increase accountability of governing elites towards other elites with divergent interests, 
while broad but not universal property rights security can generate accountability of public 
officials to the majority.  
 
These findings suggest that if broadly inclusive economic development is the goal, then 
aggregate growth and average socio-economic indicators such as HDI are incomplete and 
possibly inappropriate measures of success in achieving this objective.  28 
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